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Parliament'sprohibition on cloning in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act has led to
divergent views on the validity of the legislation. This article responds to an article in volume
29, no. 2 of this journal by BarbaraBillingsley and Timothy Caulfield, who suggested that the
federal ban would likely not survive a Charter challenge. Billingsley and Caulfield argued
that scientific experiments are expressive acts, deserving ofprotection under section 2(b) of the
Charter, which guarantees freedom of expression. In their view, both the breadth of the
legislative objective and the proportionality of the measure would preclude the courts from
finding the ban to be saved under section 1.
Downie, Llewellyn, and Baylis challenge Billingsley and Caulfield's thesis on a number of
grounds. The first is the classification of scientific experiments as expressive acts. Using the
criteriafor a section 2(b) challenge outlined in Irwin Toy, the authors arguefirst that the act
of experimentation is not an act of expression, and the fact that it produces potentially
expressive results is not sufficient to bring it within the protection of the Charter.
The authors then argue that even if the ban is a violation of section 2(b) rights, it is
demonstrably justified within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. The objective of the
ban-to protect the health and safety of the public and to prevent unethical activity-ispressing
and substantial. There is a rationalconnection between the legislative objective and the ban,
such that a ban is necessary to achieve that objective, and the ban impairs freedom of
expression as little as is reasonably possible. Finally, the authors argue that the deleterious
effects of the ban are balanced y its salutaryeffects.
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Introduction
In a provocative article published recently in the Queen's Law Journal,1
Barbara Billingsley and Timothy Caulfield question whether the new federal
ban on human cloning in the Assisted Human ReproductionAct2 unjustifiably
violates freedom of expression as protected under section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' This question is important not
only for the constitutional validity of the new legislation, but more broadly,
for the legitimacy of legislated limits on scientific research. In this paper, we
answer the question posed by Billingsley and Caulfield in the negative. We
defend the constitutional validity of the ban and, by implication, the
1. Barbara Billingsley & Timothy Caulfield, 'The Regulation of Science and the Charter
of Rights: Would a Ban on Non-Reproductive Human Cloning Unjustifiably Violate
Freedom of Expression?" (2004) 29 Queen's L.J. 647.
2. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 5(1) [AHR Act]. The AHR Act
governs assisted human reproduction technologies and related research. Among other
things, it prohibits such activities as human cloning, commercial surrogacy, and creating
in vitro embryos for other than a very limited number of purposes.
3. CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [Charter].
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legitimacy of limits placed by the State, under certain circumstances, on
scientific research.
First, though, a word about terminology. Useful debate and discussion on
controversial policy issues requires the use of accurate and noncontroversial terms. To date, there has been much terminological
confusion and controversy in the public discussion on human cloning. The
terms "reproductive cloning" and "therapeutic cloning" are currently in
vogue. In simple terms, the stated goal of so-called "reproductive cloning" is
to produce a child, whereas the stated goal of so-called "therapeutic
cloning" is to develop therapies. Despite their currency, use of these terms
has been widely criticized, most carefully by the United States President's
Council on Bioethics. 4 That Council has argued that the problem with the
first term is that all cloning is reproductive. The problem with the second
term is that it suggests the availability of therapies involving cloning
technologies that simply do not exist. There are no therapies, only basic
research. The Council therefore introduced the terms "cloning-to-producechildren" and "cloning-for-biomedical-research."
Billingsley and Caulfield sidestep this issue by using the parallel terms
"reproductive human cloning" and "non-reproductive human cloning"
[NRHC]. We applaud their attempt to move away from the misleading
language of "therapeutic cloning," but we question their choice of terms. In
our view, the term "non-reproductive human cloning" does not clearly
demarcate the activity of interest, namely cloning for research purposes. In
this paper, we use the terms introduced by the President's Councilcloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research.
Now we proceed to the Charter analysis. The first step is to consider
5
whether the Charter applies. It applies where there is government action.
Since what is at issue here is a piece of federal legislation, there is clearly
government action. The second step is to consider whether the action
imposes a limit on a protected right or freedom (in this case, freedom of
expression under section 2(b)).6 If it does, (or if, for the sake of argument,

4. U.S., The President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An
EthicalInquiry (Washington, D.C.: 2002) at 37-55.
5. As per s. 32 of the Charter. See also Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union
(R. W.D.S. U.) v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [DolphinDelivery].
6. Dolphin Delivery, ibid.
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we assume that it does), the third step is to determine whether, under
section 1, the limit is "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society," and therefore constitutionally permissible.7 The onus rests with
the party claiming the Charter violation to show the limitation of a
protected right, whereupon the onus shifts to the government to justify
that limitation. We will discuss each step of the Charteranalysis below, and
we will conclude that the ban on human cloning does not limit section 2(b)
rights, as cloning-for-biomedical-research is not expressive activity. We will
also conclude that if the ban is held to be a breach of section 2(b), it should
be saved by section 1.

I. Is "Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research"
Protected Under Section 2(b) of the Charter?
A. An Introduction to the Section 2(b) Analysis
Section 2(b) of the Charter establishes: "Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms: ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication. " '
In determining the meaning and the scope of Charter-protected rights
and freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that a large and
liberal approach to interpretation must be taken-one that is mindful of
the purposes of the section at issue and the Charter as a whole.9 Thus,
understanding the rationales or purposes underlying the Charter and the
guarantee of freedom of expression is key to assessing potential violations
of section 2(b). In general, the Charteris a rights-protecting document, and
the Supreme Court of Canada has found that its rights-protectig sections
ought to be interpreted liberally and that exceptions or limitations must be
read narrowly."0 In Irwin Toy, the Court identified three principles behind
the protection of freedom of expression:
7. Charter,supra note 3, s. 1.

8. Ibid., s. 2(b).
9. Hunterv. Southarn, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155-57.
10. See e.g. ibid. at 156; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344; Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 499. Some recent cases have seen a departure
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(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity; (2) participation in social
and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in

forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who
convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed.11

These principles protect and promote the following values which are
at the core of the guarantee of freedom of expression-the attainment of

truth, democratic participation and self-fulfilment. The protection
warranted will thus be shaped by the extent to which the expression at
issue reflects these values.
B. An Overview of the Application of Section 2(b) to Cloning-forBiomedical-Research
With this as a backdrop, the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy
laid out a general approach to determine whether a violation of section
2(b) has occurred. An activity is only protected by section 2(b) if it is

expressive, if the expression is not violent and if neither the purpose nor12
effect of the government action is to restrict freedom of expression.
We will apply this approach to the specific issue of the ban on human

cloning-for-biomedical-research.
The threshold question, and the key question, is whether human
cloning for research purposes constitutes expression as protected under

section 2(b). The Supreme Court of Canada has, as Billingsley and
Caulfield suggest, given a broad scope to the concept of expression in

section 2(b). This has led some to assume that virtually all activity will
constitute expression and attract the protection of section 2(b), thus
from this general rule with respect to certain rights under the Charter.This approach has,
however, been consistently approached in the context of section 2(b).
11. Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 968-71 [Irwin Toy]. Also see generally
Dolphin Delivery, supra note 5 at 583-86; and R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 806,
McLachlin J. (as she then was) in dissent but not on this issue [Keegstra]. McLachlin J.
explained that no one justification for s. 2(b) is more significant than the others, but
rather that different purposes will be of more importance depending on the circumstances
of the case. All three rationales are, however, capable of providing guidance as to the
meaning and the scope of the right.
12. Irwin Toy, ibid.
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leaving the work of sorting out the limits of that protection to section
1.13 However, while the scope of the protection is wide, it is a mistake to
see it as unlimited. Not all activity is protected. It must be expressive
activity-that is, it must convey meaning. The almost tautological
nature of the Court's definition does not mean that it is limitless. All
activity has the potential to convey meaning, but much activity is not
undertaken for that reason. Our daily lives are full of activities which
are not done to convey meaning to others but are simply part of living.
Driving to work, sleeping, preparing dinner, and eating could certainly
be used to convey meaning, but that is not why we do these things each
day. Thus, they would not come within the protection of section 2. We
contend that Billingsley and Caulfield's arguments stretch the protection
offered by section 2(b) beyond what it can bear.
The question of whether cloning-for-biomedical-research constitutes
expressive activity within the meaning of section 2(b) is most central to
the debate over whether banning such research will violate freedom of
expression. If that question is answered affirmatively, the other two
steps in the section 2(b) analysis are likely to be satisfied in the case of
cloning-for-biomedical-research.
We agree with Billingsley and
Caulfield's view that such research is non-violent.14 Pro-life advocates
may take exception to this assumption, and may argue that the
destruction of the embryo entailed in cloning-for-biomedical-research is
indeed violent. However, this argument is unlikely to be persuasive
given the failure of arguments before Canadian courts for the status of
the fetus as a person. 5 As to the remaining step in the section 2(b)
analysis-whether the purpose or effect of the government action is to
restrict freedom of expression-it seems likely that if cloning-for13. See e.g. Peter W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell,
1997). "Is there any activity that is not expression under the court's definition? The
answer is not much.. . . " (Ibid., s. 40.5(a)).
14. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 668.
15. See e.g. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; Borowski v. A.G. (Can.) (1987), 39
D.L.R. (4th) 731 (Sask. C.A.). In Borowski, the Court of Appeal determined that the fetus
is not included within the term "everyone" in section 7, or within the meaning of

"individual" in section 15 of the Charter.The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada but the status of the fetus was not dealt with since it was determined that the
issue had become moot (Borowski v. Canada(A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342).
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biomedical-research is found to be expressive activity (either itself or by
virtue of its role in the production of information), restricting freedom
of expression would certainly be found to be the effect, if not the
purpose of the ban.6

C A DetailedAnalysis of Whether Cloning-for-Biomedical-Researchis
Expressive Activity
The locus of our disagreement with Billingsley and Caulfield is
therefore their assertion that cloning-for-biomedical-research is
expressive activity within the meaning of section 2.
Billingsley and Caulfield argue that a researcher engaged in cloning-forbiomedical-research is engaged in an expressive act. They write:
... in the context of scientific research, NRHC arguably conveys a message both in
terms of the information produced from an NRHC experiment and as a means of
communication. Such experimentation 1is7 inherently communicative and therefore is
encompassed by section 2(b)'s protection.

Billingsley and Caulfield appear to be making two different sorts of
claims with respect to how cloning-for-biomedical-research is expressive
16. The Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy set out the test for making this
determination. The Court held that the government's purpose must be assessed from the
standpoint of the guarantee in question, otherwise the government would generally be
able to assert that its purpose was something other than limiting expression. The
Supreme Court of Canada explained in Irwin Toy, supra note 11 at para. 49:
If the government's purpose is to restrict the content of expression by singling out
particular meanings that are not to be conveyed, it necessarily limits the guarantee of free
expression. If the government's purpose is to restrict a form of expression in order to
control access by others to the meaning being conveyed or to control the ability of the one
conveying the meaning to do so, it also limits the guarantee. On the other hand, where the
government aims to control only the physical consequences of certain human activity,
regardless of the meaning being conveyed, its purpose is not to control expression.
Even if it were found that the purpose of the ban was not to limit expression, the ban
might still violate section 2(b) if it had the effect of restricting the right. For the ban to
have such an effect, it would have to be shown that the activity of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch promoted one of these objectives underlying the guarantee of freedom of
expression, as quoted above (see text accompanying note 11). Arguably, this could be shown.
17. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 665-66.
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activity. First, they claim that it is expressive because it produces
information in the form of research findings that convey meaning.
Second, they argue that the research is itself an expressive act which
conveys meaning quite apart from the information it produces. We argue
below that the first of these claims is mistaken. As to the second claim, it
has two possible versions: either that the research methods are so
intertwined with the results they produce that they must be protected, or
that the research itself conveys symbolic meaning. We argue that on the
first version, Billingsley and Caulfield's claim is wrong, and that on the
second version it is significantly narrower than they suggest.
(i) Information Production as a Form of Expression
The first claim Billingsley and Caulfield make is that cloning-forbiomedical-research is expressive by virtue of the fact that it produces
information, thereby conveying meaning in the form of research results.
They write:
Thus, the question is not whether NRHC itself is communicative, but whether a scientist
who carries out NRHC intends the experiment to convey information. A researcher does
not undertake NRHC or any other experimental physical process merely to achieve a
particular physical result devoid of meaning. By definition a scientist who carries out
NRHC in the context of research is doing so for the purpose of obtaining information about
the physical world-information on such matters as whether a predicted outcome is
possible and on the effect, use and limitations of that outcome. The experiment or procedure
is performed as part of the process of scientific inquiry, which involves formulating a
hypothesis and then conducting experiments to determine the validity of the hypothesis.
Within the scientific community, physical experiments and procedures are the premier
method of communication, and are undertaken for the express purpose of conveying a message
to the researcherand to others. So, while some activities may be done with no intention to
18
convey meaning, genuine scientific experimentation necessarily conveys meaning.

On this argument, cloning-for-biomedical-research (and indeed any
research methodology) should be protected under freedom of expression
because it leads to the production of information, and such information has
meaning.

18. Ibid. at 663-64 [emphasis added].
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We have no quarrel with the claim that research results convey
meaning. Indeed, a ban on the publication of scientific research results
would clearly violate freedom of expression. Furthermore, stating
hypotheses or research questions is also expressive activity, and a ban on
such activity would violate freedom of expression. However, this is not
what is being prohibited through the ban on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. Billingsley and Caulfield's argument conflates research findings
with research methods, and seeks to protect the methods by virtue of
their association with the findings. This ignores the fact that inquiry is
not itself communication. Inquiry is aimed at seeking information, not
conveying meaning. Thus, Billingsley and Caulfield erroneously
conflate two discrete steps in the process.
Research is an activity undertaken for the purpose of obtaining
information that can then be communicated to others. Billingsley and
Caulfield claim that banning a method or means of conducting research
amounts to a ban on collecting information or acquiring knowledge, and
thus to a ban on conveying meaning. The logic underlying this claim is
that one ought to be entitled to protection for the methods or means
through which one seeks to produce information that conveys meaning.
Were this approach accepted, the scope of section 2(b) protection would
be expanded to include all activities related or connected to the conveying
of meaning, whether or not such activities are themselves expressive. This
would certainly stretch the scope of section 2(b) beyond the lines
currently drawn by the Supreme Court of Canada, which require that the
activity itself be expressive in order to be protected. Further, it is unclear
what the limits of such an approach would be. What manner of activities
might claim protection by virtue of their connection to activities that
convey meaning? For example, would a ban on parking in the area
surrounding one's laboratory constitute an infringement on the right to
freedom of expression if one could show that the parking facilitated the
research?' 9 Would a ban on importing research materials be a breach of
section 2(b) if importation was the only way to gain access to them?
The argument Billingsley and Caulfield advance is similar to one rejected
by the Supreme Court of Canada with respect to the meaning of freedom
19. Note that the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy used parking as a typical
example of non-expressive activity, supranote 11 at 969.
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of association under section 2(d) of the Charter.21 In Dunmore v. Ontario,21
it was argued that for the protection of freedom to associate to be
meaningful, it must include the purposes for which individuals seek to
associate. This argument was advanced in the labour relations context,
where it was argued that the freedom to associate must include the
freedom to bargain collectively and strike, since without such protection
the freedom to associate would be meaningless.22 The Supreme Court of
Canada rejected this argument as extending the scope of the freedom of
association beyond its bounds. In doing so, it affirmed Justice McIntyre's
reasoning in an earlier case:
People, by merely combining together, cannot create an entity which has greater
constitutional rights and freedoms than they, as individuals, possess. Freedom of
association cannot therefore vest independent rights in the group .... If the right asserted
is not found in the Charter for the individual, it cannot be implied for the group merely
by the/act of association. It follows as well that the rights 23
of the individual members of the
group cannot be enlarged merely by the/act ofassociation.

20. Section 2(d) of the Charter, supra note 3, establishes: "Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms: ... (d) freedom of association."
21. Dunmore v. Ontario(A.G.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 [Dunmore].
22. Most recently in Dunmore, ibid. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Dunmore did recognize an obligation to ensure that basic rights to association
are protected for vulnerable groups. This obligation might require for the most
vulnerable workers the right to form a union to be able to make collective
representations to their employer. The exception does not, however, alter the basic
principle that acts do not attract protection by virtue of their relationship to the purposes
of an association.
23. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta),[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at
398-99 [emphasis added]. The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunmore clarified that
protection under section 2(d) does not require that one show an individual analogue for
the right in question. Indeed, the Court recognized that there are some activities which
are inherently collective in nature and cannot be understood in individualistic terms. The
prohibition of such activities will be held to violate section 2(d) without the need to show
a corresponding constitutional right for individuals. Associations may thus be
qualitatively and not merely quantitatively distinct from an individual. This development
in the law does not, however, take away from the point we are making: namely, that the
aims of an association are not protected simply by virtue of there being an association.
The Supreme Court of Canada is very clear that "[t]his is not to say that all such activities
are protected by s. 2(d), nor that all collectivities are worthy of constitutional
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On this reasoning, groups cannot, as a part of their right to associate, claim
protection for the purposes for which they decided to join together. There is
a clear analogy here to the argument Billingsley and Caulfield advance with
respect to section 2(b). They seek protection for the methods of research by
virtue of the relationship between those methods and the resulting
information. For the same reasons one cannot use the right to associate to
ground a right to carry out the purposes or goals of the association, one
cannot use the fact that research findings convey meaning to ground a right
to pursue whatever processes produce these results. Such processes would
have to find their own independent source of protection. In other words,
they would themselves have to be found to constitute expressive activity,
completely apart from their role in the production of information.
Billingsley and Caulfield make a further claim in response to potential
concerns with their position that research methods ought to be protected
because of their instrumental relationship to the production of
information. They suggest that research methods are not only connected to
the production of knowledge, but that the connection is so intimate that it
is impossible to separate methods from findings (i.e. results). 4 The Supreme
Court of Canada has found that such a relationship can exist between
means of expression and the conveyance of meaning in the context of
language:
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there cannot
be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from using the
a means or medium of expression; it
language of one's choice. Language is not merely
25
colours the content and meaning of expression.

Thus, it is possible that the means of expression might be so tied to the
content as to warrant protection under section 2(b). However, this does
little to help Billingsley and Caulfield's cause. Language has an entirely
different connection to conveying meaning than research methods do.
Language gives form to expression. As the medium of expression, it does
more than simply generate substance-it is key to the expression of that
protection.... In sum, a purposive approach to s. 2(d) demands that we 'distinguish
between the associational aspects of the activity and the activity itself'. . . . " Ibid. at 1042.
24. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 665.
25. Fordv. Quebec (A. G), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 748 [Ford].
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substance to others. In contrast, a research methodology generates
information that one can then convey apart from that methodology.
Research methods do not stand in relation to research results as language
does to ideas and so cannot seek protection by virtue of that connection.
Thus, the first argument advanced by Billingsley and Caulfield as to
why the ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research constitutes a violation
of freedom of expression is unsuccessful insofar as it relies on the
connection between research methods and research findings.
(ii) Research as a Form of Expression in Itself
The second argument advanced by Billingsley and Caulfield seeks to
protect research methods as a form of expression in and of themselves,
quite apart from the role they play in producing information. Billingsley
and Caulfield offer two related versions of this argument. The first
claims that the research process itself conveys meaning to the researcher.
The second rests on the potential for research as an activity to convey a
symbolic message. We will deal with each of these claims in turn.
(a) Expression to the Researcher
The first claim in support of cloning-for-biomedical-research as
expressive activity in and of itself points to the meaning that the activity
of research conveys to the researcher. Billingsley and Caulfield explain:
.. that physical processes can convey information, and indeed may be undertaken for
that express purpose. Thus, the physical technique of NRHC arguably has a
communicative element separate from the recording or dissemination of the results of the
itself, by its very nature, communicates a message to the
experiment. The experiment
26
person conducting it.

We have no quarrel with the claim that an experiment communicates a
message to the person conducting the experiment. However, we hasten to
point out that this claim fails to support the contention that the researcher
is engaged in an expressive act, as the research and the researcher are not

26. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 663.
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one and the same. If the experiment is communicating facts about the
world to the researcher, it follows that what is at stake is not the
researcher's expression but rather that of the research, which of course has
no Charter rights."
If this is not the claim that Billingsley and Caulfield are making here,
then they are making an argument little different than one considered
earlier-namely, that the research process produces information. Thus,
in conducting research, the researcher is obtaining content for future
communication, but he or she is not yet communicating. Insofar as this
is the heart of Billingsley and Caulfield's claim, it fails for the reasons
discussed earlier.
(b) Research as Self-Expression by the Researcher
Implicit in Billingsley and Caulfield's discussion of the researcher's
relationship with the research is another argument for research methods
as expressive activities-that is, that the research process might serve as a
form of self-expression for the researcher. The physical process of
research and the particular methods selected might be a means of
individual self-expression, in the way that an artist's painting is a form
of self-expression. If this is their claim, it is the same as the second
version of their argument that research is itself expressive-that is, that
in selecting research topics and conducting research in certain ways, the
researcher may be conveying a message about his or her beliefs,
convictions or political views. Billingsley and Caulfield maintain, then,
that an experiment itself can be "a means of communication." Here,
they turn to analogy to explain their point:
If a research scientist intends to convey meaning through a particular physical process or
experiment, it follows that the scientist's selection of a given experiment also conveys a
meaning, much as the language chosen by a speaker, the type of dance selected by a dancer,
or the art form selected by an artist. As Cantrell suggests, "[r]esearch becomes a type of

27. This is not to suggest that freedom of expression offers no protection for the
listener/recipient but rather that this interest is not the source of the right; it is instead
premised on the speaker/expressor being able to attract section 2(b) protection. The
Supreme Court of Canada in Ford recognizes the importance of protecting commercial
expression for the sake of the listener and the speaker. Supra note 25 at 767.
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'symbolic speech' much like students wearing black armbands and antiwar activists
burning their draft cards." A scientist engaging in NRHC, for example, may be sending a
message that in his or her view, it is the key to curing particular medical ailments such as
diabetes or paralysis. The scientist chooses to spend his or her time 28on NRHC, because of a
belief that it is the most promising way to cure particular ailments.

We have already addressed the Supreme Court of Canada's
consideration of language and the ways in which it is distinct from
research methods. If the claim is no more than that research methods are
intimately linked with the content of expression, it will fail for the
reasons discussed earlier. However, Billingsley and Caulfield seem to
mix their arguments here. Language is not protected because it is
symbolic speech. The argument for symbolic speech recognizes that
actions can convey meaning. The concept of symbolic speech was
developed in the context of American First Amendment jurisprudence,
where it was necessary because the wording of the protection is the
much narrower "free speech," not the more encompassing "freedom of
expression" in the Canadian Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada
has, however, addressed the underlying idea that Billingsley and

Caulfield rely on, namely, that physical acts which might generally be
seen as pure action (i.e. devoid of meaning) could in certain
circumstances be used to convey meaning, and thus be deserving of
protection under section 2(b). The Supreme Court of Canada explained
in Irwin Toy:
Of course, while most human activity combines expressive and physical elements, some
human activity is purely physical and does not convey or attempt to convey meaning. It
might be difficult to characterize certain day-to-day tasks, like parking a car, as having
expressive content. To bring such activity within the protected sphere, the plaintiff
would have to show that it was performed to convey a meaning. For example, an
unmarried person might, as part of a public protest, park in a zone reserved for spouses
of government employees in order to express dissatisfaction or outrage at the chosen
method of allocating a limited resource. If that person could demonstrate that his activity
did in fact have expressive content, he would, at this stage, be within the protected sphere
and the s. 2(b) challenge would proceed. 29

28. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 665.
29. Irwin Toy, supranote 11 at 969.
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We suggest that while the conduct of research could have expressive
content apart from the information it generates, this is not
automatically so. The researcher would have to demonstrate that the act
was undertaken to express meaning rather than to produce meaningful
information. Just as parking could have expressive content, so too could
a research method. One cannot, however, assume that this is the case,
and conclude that research methods are protected. Just as many people
park illegally without attempting to convey any meaning, so too many
researchers conduct research without intending to convey meaning
through the act itself. Illegal parking is often simply a means to an end
(for example, to getting somewhere-perhaps to give a lecture, or for
some other end with expressive content). So too can research be merely
instrumental in the production of meaning, which can then be
conveyed. Indeed, in the case at hand, the purpose of cloning is reflected
in the label itself-cloning-for-biomedical-research. It is cloning not to
make a political statement, or cloning as artistic expression, but rather
cloning to conduct biomedical research and produce information. This
is not to say that cloning could not be done in order to convey meaning,
but the fact that it could be done to convey meaning would not alone be
sufficient reason to protect all cloning as expressive activity.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada's comments in Irwin Toy
suggest that the message or meaning which one seeks to convey must be
more than an announcement that one is undertaking an activity. Thus,
parking illegally does not have meaning simply because it communicates
that one is parked in a certain spot. Similarly, a research method will
not be expressive merely because it asserts: "This is the way I am
conducting research." That assertion does nothing more than recognize
that a physical act is occurring. One must, rather, intend to send a
message through the physical act.
It is then possible (although not necessarily the case) that the activity of
cloning could be undertaken by the researcher, as Billingsley and Caulfield
seem to contemplate, to convey his or her view that "this research is the
key to curing particular medical ailments."3" However, this argument for
research as expression conflates expressing a view and acting in furtherance
of that view. Freedom of expression does not encompass the freedom to act
30. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 665.
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on views in the name of expressing them. Even if an argument of this
sort could be mounted, the onus would rest with the researcher to show
that the research was undertaken for this expressive purpose. Thus, this
possibility does not support Billingsley and Caulfield's claim that
cloning-for-biomedical-research would always attract the protection of
section 2(b). Furthermore, as we shall discuss in more detail, if the
protection exists only in these limited circumstances, the implications
for the prospects of justifying the infringement under section 1 of the
Charter are significant. If cloning is protected as a means of expressing
the researcher's beliefs, it is clear that a ban on cloning will not be a
complete ban on expression, since the researcher has other means of
expressing these beliefs, including direct speech.
Before moving on, we note that at the root of Billingsley and
Caulfield's argument may be the concern that the failure to protect
research methods will in some circumstances mean that information
cannot be obtained or verified.31 This may be unfortunate and
undesirable, but it is not proper grounds for finding a violation of the
Charter'sguarantee of freedom of expression.
We now consider whether, even if this limit on expression is found to be
a violation of section 2(b) of the Charter,it could be saved under section 1.

II. Can the Ban on Cloning-for-BiomedicalResearch Be Saved Under Section 1 of the

Charter?
A. Introduction
Once an infringement of a Charter-protected right or freedom is
established, the onus shifts to the government to show that the limitation
can be justified.
Section 1 of the Charter reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to

31. However, this does depend on whether there is some other means of obtaining or producing

such information. It is worth noting that it has not yet been shown that cloning-for-biomedicalresearch is necessary for the production of information that is otherwise inaccessible.
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such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."32
The test for applying section 1 can be found in the wording of the
section itself-the government must show that the limitation is
reasonable and prescribed by law and that it is justifiable in a free and
democratic society.33 The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes
provided a framework or guidelines for a section 1 analysis,34 but the
Court has consistently warned against being too formalistic. 5 The
analysis under section 1 must be flexible and mindful of context, since
at its core, the section seeks to balance individual rights against the
interests of the community.3 6 This contextual approach entails greater
flexibility with respect to laws that seek to balance competing rights
than with respect to those that limit individual rights, as in the criminal
context.3 7 This is significant for our purposes, since the ban on cloningfor-biomedical-research is clearly legislation of the former type, and
thus warrants a more deferential approach under section 1.
The first requirement of section 1 is that any limit be prescribed by
law. This has been interpreted to mean that '(1) the law must be
adequately accessible to the public, and (2) the law must be formulated
with sufficient precision to enable people to regulate their conduct by it,
and to provide guidance to those who apply the law." 38 This
requirement is clearly met with respect to the ban on cloning-for39
biomedical-research as it is prescribed by section 5(1) of the AHR Act.

32. Charter,supra note 3, s. 1.
33. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada(Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, La Forest J.,
dissenting but not on this issue [RJR -MacDonald].

34. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [Oakes].
35. See e.g. Edmonton Journalv. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [Edmonton Journal];
and RJR-MacDonald,supra note 33 at paras. 62, 126.

36. Edmonton Journal,ibid.
37. Irwin Toy, supra note 11 at 993-94; and McKinney et a. v. University of Guelph et al.,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 280, 304.
38. Hogg, supra note 13, s. 35.7(a).
39. AHR Act, supra note 2. While Billingsley and Caulfield make some claims as to

vagueness at the "prescribed by law" stage of the analysis, any support they offer for
those claims goes to assessing the objective of the legislation and not to assessing what the
legislation provides.
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The framework for determining whether a limit is demonstrably
justified under section 1 requires that two criteria be met. First, the
objective of the legislation must be "of sufficient importance," that is, it
must relate to concerns which are "pressing and substantial in a free and
democratic society."4" Once a pressing and substantial objective is found,
the government must show that the means chosen are proportionate to
that objective.4 The Supreme Court of Canada has identified three
important components of the proportionality test. First, the means
chosen must be rationally connected to the objective (that is, "the
measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational
considerations."42) Second, the means chosen should limit the rights or
freedoms "as little as reasonably possible."43 Third, there must be
proportionality between the effects of the measures and the objective, as
well as "between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures."" 4
Billingsley and Caulfield argue that justifying a ban on cloning-forbiomedical-research under the section 1 test "would be extraordinarily
difficult, because the objectives commonly associated with the ban are
extremely vague, and it would arguably amount to a complete denial of
scientific expression."45 We disagree with both of these assertions. First,
we take issue with both their approach to the section 1 test and their
characterization of the objectives underlying the legislation. Second, we
disagree with their characterization of the limitation on freedom of
expression caused by the legislation. We argue that, properly
understood, the ban does not constitute a complete limit on expression
and is thus not as difficult to justify as they suggest.

40. Oakes, supra note 34 at 138-39.
41. Ibid. at 139.

42. Ibid.
43. The Supreme Court of Canada added the reasonableness condition in R.v.Edwards
Books andArt Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 772 [Edwards Books].
44. Dagenais v. CBC,[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 889.
45. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 668-69.
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B. Pressingand SubstantialObjective
Billingsley and Caulfield claim that the objectives of the ban are
"extremely vague"46 and "remarkably broad and equivocal." 47 They
characterize the goals of the legislation as "the promotion and protection of
human health, safety and dignity, and the prevention of commodification
of the embryo (presumably also for the underlying purpose of protecting
and preserving human health, safety and dignity)."48 They argue that if
the objectives are the promotion and protection of human health, safety
and dignity, then the objectives are so vague that it is difficult to
determine whether they are pressing and substantial.
First, it is important to note that only in rare cases will the courts not
defer to the legislature's determination that the objective of a law is
pressing and substantial enough to warrant a limitation on rights.49 In
determining the objectives of legislation, courts are not limited to the
statements in the legislature concerning the objective, nor is the lack of
such statements problematic. While courts will certainly attend to the
stated objectives, as well as to legislative history or other expressions of
legislative intent, the courts will also pay close attention to the statute
itself in ascertaining its objectives. Furthermore, objectives can be
expressed at various levels of generality. Typically, the more generally
the objective is expressed, the easier it is to show it to be pressing and
substantial. However, one ought to be cautious of expressing objectives too
generally. The more general they are, the more difficult it may be to show
that the means chosen impair the rights at issue as little as possible, as there
will often be multiple ways to achieve a general objective."
Ascertaining the objectives of legislation is ultimately a matter of
interpretation, and courts will look to a number of sources to inform
their interpretation. Thus, it is perplexing that Billingsley and Caulfield
take such a narrow approach to determining the objectives of the AHR
Act. They fail to look to the specific statutory provision, to the statute

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibid. at 669.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hogg, supra note 13, s. 35.8(b).
For further discussion, see ibid., s. 35.9(a).
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more broadly, or to the legislative history. Instead, they focus on the
statement of values in the legislation which they concede was not an
express statement of legislative purpose.51 It is perhaps not surprising
that a section expressing "values" underlying the legislation would be
framed at a high level of generality. Given that the legislature did not
clearly express the objectives of the legislation, it will be for the courts
to determine these objectives. There is no basis to argue that the courts
will find the objectives to be at such a level of generality that they will
be open to Billingsley and Caulfield's critique. Before turning to a
consideration of the possible objectives of the AHR Act, we will make a
few further comments about the approach that Billingsley and Caulfield
take to this step in the section 1 analysis.
Billingsley and Caulfield's discussion of the vagueness of the legislative
objectives seems to confuse the issue of whether the law is sufficiently
precise so as to count as "prescribed by law" with the issue of the level of
generality at which the objectives are expressed. The mere fact that
objectives are expressed at a high level of generality does not render them
vague. Billingsley and Caulfield point to the recent judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sauvi, in which a narrow majority of
the Court found the objectives of the legislation denying voting rights to
prisoners serving sentences of two years or longer to be "problematically
vague."52 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, held that the
reasons offered by the government to justify the legislation were symbolic,
abstract and rhetorical. Nevertheless, she found that they were "capable in
principle of justifying limitations on Charter rights."53 It is also important
to note that her inquiry into the objectives of the legislation was not
limited to the assertions in the statute itself, as Billingsley and Caulfield's
inquiry was.54 Further, we would argue that the objectives of the AHR Act
are not vague, symbolic, abstract or rhetorical.

51. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 669-70.
52. R v. Sauv, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 538 [Sauvel.
53. Ibid. at 542. McLachlin C.J.C. also determined that "despite the abstract nature of
the government's objective and the rather thin basis upon which they rest, prudence
suggests that we proceed to the proportionality analysis, rather than dismissing the
government's objectives outright." (Ibid.)
54. Billingsley & Caulfield, supranote 1 at 669-76.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has held that legislative history may be
useful in the section 1 inquiry,55 and ample support for our view can be
found in the legislative history of the AHR Act. Hogg points out that
while "legislative history" has not been defined with any precision, the
term can be used broadly to refer to the "documentary evidence of the
events that occurred during the drafting and enactment of a statute."56
Hogg identifies a number of sources one might look to as part of the
legislative history of an act-commission or parliamentary committee
reports, government policy papers, reports relied on by the government at
the time of enactment, earlier versions of the statute, expert testimony
before a parliamentary committee and speeches by Ministers or other
legislators.57
On the basis of a review of such sources, we argue that Billingsley and
Caulfield mischaracterize the law's objective, and that the objective of
banning cloning-for-biomedical-research is much more specific than
they suggest. That objective is to prevent an activity thought to pose
health and safety concerns-an activity considered by most Canadians to
be ethically unacceptable, and one for which there was thought to be
alternatives. This can be gleaned both from the statute itself and from its
legislative history, as illustrated by reference to a considerable number
of sources of the sort referred to by Hogg.58 According to the legislation
itself, "[t]his enactment prohibits assisted reproduction procedures that
are considered to be ethically unacceptable." 9
In a 2001 report entitled Assisted Human Reproduction: Building
Families,the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health said:
(i) Cloning for Reproductive and "Therapeutic" Purposes
The Committee feels strongly that the potential adverse effects, whether physical,

psychological or social, for the resulting children are sufficient reason to prohibit

55. Edwards Books, supra note 43 at 745-49, 769-72, 796-800; Irwin Toy, supra note 11 at
983-84; and Keegstra, supra note 11 at 745.
56. Hogg, supranote 13, s. 57.1(a).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., s. 57.1(b).
59. Bill C-6, An Act respecting assisted human reproductionand related research, 3d Sess.,
37th Parl., 2004, Summary (assented to 29 March 2004), S.C. 2004, c.2.
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reproductive cloning. In addition, "therapeutic cloning" should be banned as it is unsafe
and commodifies the embryo.
(iii) Embryo Research: Our Views
We heard that while embryonic stem cell research presents some possibilities, other
sources such as umbilical cord blood and adult source stem cells are more available, more
easily obtainable, and less ethically contentious. Some witnesses argued that research on
stem cells using sources other than embryos might be sufficient to attain the stem cell
potential. Others pointed out that, although use of adult stem cells is the preference for
most researchers, the use of embryonic stem cells at this time might provide the
information needed to properly manipulate adult stem cells.
The Committee was struck by testimony that, in the past year, there have been
tremendous gains in adult stem research in humans. We also heard that, after many years
of embryo stem cell research with animal models, the results have not provided the
expected advances. Therefore, we want to encourage research funding the area of adult
stem cells.
We are concerned that embryonic stem cell research commodifies the embryo. It involves
research that uses embryos to obtain further research material.60

Earlier, in a 1996 White Paper on New Reproductive Technologies,

Health Canada stated:
The major objectives of the new legislation are the following: first, to protect the health
and safety of Canadians in the use of human reproductive materials for assisted
reproduction, other medical procedures and medical research; second, to ensure the
appropriate treatment of human reproductive materials outside the body; and third, to
61
protect the dignity and security of all persons, especially women and children.

Still earlier, in the 1993 Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, the objectives are spelled out:

60. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, "Assisted Human
Reproduction:
Building
Families"
(December
2001),
online:
< http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/HEAL/Studies/Reports/healrpol/03-cove.htm>.
61. Health Canada, New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies: Setting Boundaries,
Enhancing Health, Govdoc: H21-127/1996E (Ottawa: 1996) at 25; Health Canada,
Reproductiveand Genetic Technologies: Overview Paper (Ottawa: 1999).
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We have judged that certain activities conflict so sharply with the values espoused by
Canadians and by this Commission, and are so potentially harmful to the interests of
individuals and of society, that they must be prohibited by the federal government under
threat of criminal sanction. These actions include human zygote/embryo research
related to ectogenesis, cloning, animal/human hybrids, the transfer of 62
zygotes to another
species, or the maturation and fertilization of eggs from human fetuses.

These objectives are echoed in other Health Canada documents, in the
legislation itself, and in many of the explanatory documents released by
Health Canada when the legislation was introduced in the House.63

We therefore argue that the objectives of the ban are not unduly broad,
equivocal or vague, but rather reflect pressing and substantial concerns.

Parliament clearly intended the legislation to prohibit an unsafe, unproven
activity that most Canadians find to be ethically unacceptable, and instead
to focus resources on available alternatives. The ban would, in our view,

pass the first part of the Supreme Court of Canada's section 1 test.
C. ProportionateMeans

We must now consider the proportionality of the statutory limitation
on the section 2(b) right.

(i) Rational Connection
First, we must ask whether there is a rational connection between the

objective and the legislated ban. We argue there is quite clearly such a
connection. If the objective is to prevent the occurrence of an activity

considered to be risky and ethically unacceptable, then a legislated ban on
the activity is rationally connected to the objective. In other words, as
62. Canada, Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceedwith Care:
Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 2 (Ottawa:

Communications Group, 1993) at 1022.
63. See e.g. Health Canada, Proposals for Legislation Governing Assisted Human
Reproduction: Executive Summary (Ottawa: May 2001), online: <http://www.hc-

sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2001/2001_44bk1_e.html>

[Health

Canada, Executive

Summary]; Health Canada, Proposed Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction-

Frequently Asked Questions (9 May 2002),
asc/media/nr-cp/2002/2002_34bk2_e.html >.
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online:

<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-

the Supreme Court of Canada's test requires, the ban is not "arbitrary,
unfair or based on irrational considerations."64
(ii) As Little As Reasonably Possible
We must next ask whether the legislated ban limits freedom of expression
as little as is reasonably possible. Originally this element of the section 1
analysis required that the constitutional right be impaired "as little as
possible."65 The Supreme Court of Canada quickly realized that it would be
unreasonable to hold legislatures to that standard. An element of deference to
the legislature was introduced, and the Court now looks to ensure that the
limit is "one that was reasonable for the legislature to impose."66
If the objective of a law is to prevent an activity from happening, a
complete ban on the activity is the only way to attain that objective. If the
risks that the legislature wants to avoid are inherent in the activity itself (i.e.
if they cannot be prevented by shaping how the activity is conducted) and
if the legislature considers the activity itself to be ethically unacceptable,
then no form of restriction short of a complete prohibition can be effective.
With respect to this step of the section 1 test, the Supreme Court of
Canada has said:
[I]t will be more difficult to justify a complete ban on a form of expression than a partial
ban.... A full prohibition will only be constitutionally acceptable under the minimal

impairment stage of the analysis where the government can show that only a full
prohibition will enable it to achieve its objective."

Thus, an outright ban will be more difficult to justify when it entails a
complete infringement of the right at stake. Where a complete ban results
in a total denial of the freedom of expression, it is more difficult to
convince the Court that the right was infringed a little as is reasonably
possible.68

64. Oakes, supra note 34 at para. 74. It is worthy of note that very few cases fail at this stage

of the section 1 analysis. For general discussion, see Hogg, supranote 13, s. 35.10(a).
65.
66.
67.
68.

Oakes, ibid. at para. 70.
EdwardsBooks, supra note 43 at 772, Dickson C.J.C.
RJR-MacDonald,supra note 33 at para. 163, McLachlin J.
Ibid.
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However, given our conclusion on the limited nature of the
infringement on the freedom of expression affected by the law, a total
ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research would be less difficult to justify
because, contrary to Billingsley and Caulfield's claim, it does not
constitute a total limitation on free expression. While the ban
potentially applies to one form of the researcher's expression of his or
her beliefs, the researcher is still free to convey the same meaning
through direct speech.
Even if the protection of freedom of expression is extended to research
required to produce information, Billingsley and Caulfield themselves
acknowledge,
if .... techniques other than NRHC exist or can be developed as alternative avenues of
research leading to the same results, the NRHC ban may be seen as prohibiting only one
of many possible avenues of research or scientific expression. From this perspective, it

may not completely deny scientific expression and may therefore pass the minimal
impairment criterion [the "as little as reasonably possible" test].69

Indeed, there are other avenues open to researchers who wish to
realize the potential therapeutic benefits of stem cell research. Research
using stem cells derived from adults is possible, as is research involving
embryos originally created for reproductive purposes using in vitro
fertilization (IVF) but no longer wanted for this treatment. It may even
be that these "alternative avenues of research" could lead to equal or
better therapeutic results than research using stem cells derived from
cloned embryos.7"
It has been argued that stem cells from cloned embryos are a better
source of transplant tissue than stem cells from adult organs and tissues,
because of the pluripotent nature of embryonic stem cells. Pluripotent
cells are single cells that can develop into many different cell types of the
body.7 Until recently, it was widely believed that adult stem cells were
not pluripotent and that they could only become different cell types of
69. Billingsley & Caulfield, supra note 1 at 678.
70. Fran~oise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, "An Embryonic Debate" (2005) 13:2 Literary
Review of Canada 11-13.
71. U.S., National Institutes of Health, Stern Cell Basics, online: < http://stemcells.nih.gov/
info/basics/>.
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their tissue of origin. On this view, adult blood stem cells could become
different kinds of blood cells (e.g. red blood cells and platelets) but could
not, for example, become nerve cells or muscle cells. Recent research,
however, has shown that adult stem cells may be able to make cell types
from another tissue.72 Indeed, it is now suggested that some types of
adult stem cells are pluripotent,7 3 and further research may yet show
that adult stem cells have considerably greater plasticity than is
currently thought. This clearly establishes adult stem cell research as a
legitimate "alternative avenue of research."
It has also been argued that stem cells from cloned embryos are a
better source of transplant tissue than stem cells from IVF embryos
because patients can receive a transplant of their own cells instead of
cells from a stranger.74 In this way, they can avoid the potential problem
of immune rejection and the possible need for immunosuppressive
drugs.7" The problem with this argument in support of cloning-forbiomedical-research is that there is no evidence to date of an immune
rejection problem with stem cells from IVF embryos. To the contrary,
there is some evidence suggesting the opposite-namely, that there is no
immune response with embryonic stem cell transplantation from one
organism to another. A recent study that directly evaluates the immune
response of human embryonic stem cells indicates that the injection of
these cells into immune competent mice does not induce a detectable
immune response. As well, when such cells were exposed to human
blood containing immune cells (e.g. T-cells), they did not elicit an
immune reaction (i.e. proliferation of the T-cells).76
With time and more research, we will know whether there is a risk of
immune rejection with non-autologous stem cell transplantation. In the
meantime, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there will be
72. Diane S. Krause et al., "Multi-organ, multi-lineage engraftment by a single bone
marrow-derived stem cell" (2001) 105 Cell 365; Yuhui Jiang et al., "Pluripotency of
mesenchymal stem cells derived from adult bone marrow" (2000) 418 Nature 41.
73. Jiang et al., ibid.
74. Woo Suk Hwang et aL, "Patient specific embryonic stem cells derived from human
SCNT blastocysts" (2005) 308 Science 1777 [Hwang et al., "SCNT blastocysts"].
75. Ibid.
76. Li Li et al., "Human Embryonic Stem Cells Possess Immune-Privileged Properties.
Stem Cells" (2004) 22 Stem Cells 448.
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such a problem, it does not follow that cloning-for-biomedical-research
is the only solution. 77 Alternatively, it may be possible to establish an
extensive bank of human embryonic stem cell lines and give patients
immunologically compatible cell lines. Or it may be possible to
genetically modify human stem cell lines by using gene therapy or other
techniques to create "universal" cells that are histocompatible with all
patients.7' Either of these strategies, neither of which is ethically
controversial and neither of which is banned, could reasonably be used
to address any possible immune rejection problem. Moreover, it is
worth noting here that the immune rejection problem can also be
avoided with the use of adult stem cells when autologous
transplantation is an option. Thus, again, it can be concluded that there
are "alternative avenues of research" and so, even on Billingsley and
Caulfield's own terms, the ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research can
meet the "as little as reasonably possible" requirement.
It must also be emphasized here that, as noted earlier, the legislature
turned its mind to the issue of alternative avenues, and that the Supreme
Court of Canada will not lightly substitute its assessment for that of the
government.79 The Court has indicated that some deference will be
given to the government at this stage of the analysis, particularly where
the law: a) is intended to protect a vulnerable group; b) relies on
complex social science evidence; c) must reconcile interests of competing
groups in society; and d) involves judgment on the allocation of scarce
resources.8 0 All of these factors are relevant to the AHR Act, which is at
least in part concerned with protecting those vulnerable to abuse if the
commodification of human cells results from cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. The AHR Act relies on complex social science data about the
effect or dangers of cloning. It clearly seeks to reconcile the competing
interests of science, and those who might benefit from the results of
77. Baylis & Downie, supra note 70; Francoise Baylis, "The Impossible Dream"
(Aug/Sept 2005) University Affairs 14.
78. U.S., Stem Cell Research: Special Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations(12 February 1998)

(Gearhart, Thomson, & Varmus).
79. See Sauv6, supra note 52 at 542 and Edwards Books, supra note 43 at 772.
80. Irwin Toy, supra note 11 at 993-94. Also see discussion by Hogg, supra note 13, s.

35.11(b).
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cloning-for-biomedical-research, with the interests of those who might
be harmed.
In sum, the legislature expressly turned its mind to alternatives when
weighing the potential benefits and harms of the ban, and concluded
that "at this time, the emphasis should be on a better understanding of
stem cells taken from existing human embryos."81 What matters is not
whether we (or the legislature) are right that there are alternative
avenues of research, but whether it was reasonable for the legislature to
ban cloning-for-biomedical-research while allowing other forms of stem
cell research. Given the nature of the balancing required by the
legislation, some deference is owed to the legislature for the means it has
chosen to achieve its objective.
Furthermore, the legislation contains a built-in revisitation clause
which offers more support for our position that it impairs the right as
little as is reasonably possible.82 The legislation does not say "you can
never do this," but rather, "you cannot do it at this time, given the
current state of knowledge and the values of Canadians." It expressly
contemplates changing understandings and developments in science, and
it provides for a means to revisit the ban. Therefore, we conclude that
the ban would pass the minimal impairment branch of the section 1 test.
(iii) Balance Deleterious and Salutary Effects
The third and final step in the test asks whether the legislation strikes
an appropriate balance with respect to its effects. This stage of the
analysis essentially asks whether attaining the objective comes at too
high a cost. Is the limitation on the right too great a sacrifice in relation
to the objectives of the ban?
Here again, the characterization of the expression at stake becomes
critical. It should be recalled that for the ban to be found to be a limit of
section 2(b), it must be found to limit the use of a research method as a
means of conveying the researcher's belief that, for example, "this
research is the most promising way to cure particular medical ailments."
The ban does not restrict the conveying of the results of the research.
81. Health Canada, Executive Summary, supra note 63.
82. AHR Act, supra note 2, ss. 10-12.
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Thus, the ban does not effect a complete limit on the researcher's
freedom of expression, as the researcher has other means of expressing
his or her beliefs.
The deleterious effects of restricting this limited form and content of
expression must be balanced against the salutary effects of preventing
the harms sought to be avoided through the ban on cloning-forbiomedical-research. It is here that we offer different descriptions of the
possible salutary and deleterious effects of the legislation than those
provided by Billingsley and Caulfield. The salutary effects to be
considered in this case are potentially significant. The ban can help to
prevent several types of potential harms.8 3
First, cloning-for-biomedical-research will provide assistance to those
who want to clone-to-produce-children,
effectively rendering
unenforceable the ban on cloning-to-produce-children. The technology
used for cloning-to-produce-children is identical to the technology used
for cloning-for-biomedical-research. To advance the technological
capacity to perform the latter is to advance the technological capacity to
perform the former.
Second, there are risks of physical and psychological harm to egg
providers, as well as twin risks of coercion and exploitation. Cloning
technology involves the insertion of DNA into enucleated eggs (eggs
that have had their own nucleus removed). It is understood that cloningfor-biomedical research (and possible future cloning for personalized
stem cell therapies) will require significant numbers of eggs, ideally from
young, healthy women. The first stem cell line from a cloned embryo
was derived in February 2004. This technical feat involved the research
use of 242 eggs from 16 women. 4 More recently, in May 2005, the same
research team successfully derived 11 embryonic stem cell lines from 185
fresh eggs from 18 women (an average of 17 eggs per stem cell line).15
With time and further research, the ratio of eggs to cloned embryonic
stem cell lines no doubt will continue to improve. However, the total
number of eggs needed will never be small, as the research goal is to
83. These potential harms are also discussed in Baylis & Downie, supra note 70.
84. Woo Suk Hwang et al., 'Evidence of a pluripotent human embryonic stem cell line

derived from a cloned blastocyst" (2004) 303 Science 1669.
85. Hwang et al., "SCNT blastocysts", supra note 74.
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develop personalized stem cell therapies. This means that even if the
derivation of cloned embryos becomes maximally efficient-one cloned
stem cell line from one egg-there will still need to be one egg per
patient requiring stem cell treatment. As the number of maladies
amenable to stem cell treatment continues to expand along with the
number of patients afflicted with these maladies, so will the need for
eggs for cloning. The physical and psychological harms associated with
egg retrieval are significant. They range from minor harms such as
vomiting and mood swings to significant harms, including future
infertility and even death from severe ovarian hyper-stimulation.86 As
well, with the current purchase price for eggs for research use set at
approximately $4,000 US per cycle,87 the potential for coercion is
significant. Even if there is no payment, the potential for coercion and
exploitation remains, as women undergoing infertility treatment may be
forced or enticed to give some of their eggs for research in order to have
88
access to IVF treatment at all, or at reduced or no cost.

Third, there will be opportunity costs if funding is diverted away from
other areas of research. Funds spent on cloning-for-biomedical-research
are not available for other research. Where researchers spend their time
and intellectual energies (and the time and energies of their staff, and the
resources of their labs) on cloning-for-biomedical-research, this time and
energy and these resources are not available for other research. These are
real opportunity costs.
86. "Risks and side effects of drug treatment and surgery associated with assisted
reproductive technology (ART)" (17 September 2001), online: Pregnancy MD
< http://www.pregnancymd.org/risks-and-side-effects-of-drugs-surgery-art-

reproductive.htm>; American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Patient's Fact Sheet: Side
Effects of Gonadotropins" (1999) online: <http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/
Gonadatrophins-Fact.pdf>; American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Ovulation Drugs: A

Guide for Patients. American Society of Reproductive Medicine" (2000), online:
< www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/ ovulation drugs.pdf >.
87. Ronald Green & Gwen Ifill, "Discussion: Cloning Human Cells" The NewsHour
with Jim Lebrer (26 Nov 2001), online: PBS Online < http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
health/july-decO/cloning_11-26.html >.
88. Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, "Financial
incentives in recruitment of oocyte donors" (2000) 74 Fertility and Sterility 216, online:
<http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/financialincentives.pdf>; Martin Johnson, "The
culture of unpaid and voluntary egg donation should be strengthened" (1997) 314 B.M.J. 1401.
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Finally, the sustainability of the health care system may be threatened.
Personalized cell-based regenerative medicine using cloned embryonic stem
cell lines will be very expensive. Each patient needing treatment would
have to have his or her own personalized stem cell line. This could either
bankrupt the Canadian health care system or force the introduction of a
parallel private system, with such therapies being available only to those
who can afford them. As one of us has argued elsewhere:
Consider, for example, cystic fibrosis, a genetic disease that leads to life-threatening lung
infections and which affects some 3,400 Canadians. Consider Parkinson's disease, a
neurodegenerative disease that ails about... 100,000 people in Canada. Next, consider

Alzheimer's disease.... Close to 280,000 Canadians suffer from this form dementia. These
89
three illnesses alone represent a demand for nearly 400,000 personalized stem cell lines.

If we assume 100% success in deriving stem cell lines from eggs, this
represents a demand for 400,000 eggs. Now imagine that every Canadian
(about 32 million people), at least once in his or her lifetime, will have
an illness that could be treated with a personalized stem cell line. This
would represent a demand for 32 million eggs. For economic and ethical
reasons, this is a practical impossibility.
When the benefits of avoiding these specific harms are stacked up
against the potential harm of preventing researchers from symbolically
communicating their view that cloning-for-biomedical-research is key to
curing particular medical ailments, the balance seems to weigh clearly in
favour of finding the ban proportionate. Even if the limits on expression
were more significant (i.e. if they were linked to the research results),
the balance between the salutary and deleterious effects would still be
such that the courts would be unlikely to overrule the legislature under
this part of the section 1 analysis, given the potential for using other
research methods to achieve those results.
We conclude, therefore, that the government could justify any limitation
on freedom of expression resulting from the statutory ban on cloning-forbiomedical-research.

89. Baylis, supra note 77 at 16.
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Conclusion
Like Billingsley and Caulfield, we cannot be certain that the Supreme
Court of Canada would or would not find a ban on cloning-forbiomedical-research to be a breach of section 2(b) of the Charter.
However, on the basis of the arguments we have made above, we
conclude that if the Court did find that the AHR Act restricted the
freedom of expression of researchers, it would likely hold such a
restriction to be very limited in scope and to be reasonable and justified
in a free and democratic society. It is therefore our contention that a
Charter challenge to the ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research on the
basis of freedom of expression would fail.
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